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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that 
forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such 
as the different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently 
starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, 
Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding, Section 12 (Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy), paragraphs 15 to 16 
(1748). The argument concludes with the contradiction between consistent reasoning (causal, in 
particular) and believing in the existence of Real (distinct and continued) entities. The problem 
with the Realist readings of Hume is that they attribute both to Hume. So their Hume is a self-
reflectively inconsistent philosopher. I show that the various ways to avoid this problem do not 
work. Accordingly, this paper suggests a non-Realist interpretation of Hume's philosophy: Hume 
the philosopher suspends his judgment on Metaphysical Realism. As such, his philosophical 
attitude is neutral on the divide between materialism and idealism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hume concluded Part 1, Section 12 in the An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding 
(1748)i before the posthumous 1777 edition as follows: 
  
The second objection goes farther, and represents this opinion as contrary to reason: at 
least, if it be a principle of reason, that all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the 
object. (EHU 12.16; SBN 155) 
 
It is a restatement of his conclusion of Of the modern philosophy (1.4.4) in A Treatise of 
Human Nature (1739-40)ii: 
 
Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses; or more 
properly speaking, betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those 
that persuade us of the continu’d and independent existence of body. (THN 1.4.4.15; SBN 
231) 
 
Hume refers back to this in the conclusion to Treatise 1: 
 
’Tis this principle, which makes us reason from causes and effects; and ’tis the same 
principle, which convinces us of the continu’d existence of external objects, when absent 
from the senses. But tho’ these two operations be equally natural and necessary in the 
human mind, yet in some circumstances they are directly contrary, nor is it possible for us 
to reason justly and regularly from causes and effects, and at the same time believe the 
continu’d existence of matter. How then shall we adjust those principles together? Which 
of them shall we prefer? Or in case we prefer neither of them, but successively assent to 
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both, as is usual among philosophers, with what confidence can we afterwards usurp that 
glorious title, when we thus knowingly embrace a manifest contradiction? (THN 1.4.7.4; 
SBN 265-6) 
 
Following Hume in the Enquiry, I will call the argument that concludes with this 
contradiction 'the second profound argument'. It is the other modern Pyrrhonian argument 
'against the senses' in Section 12. In this paper, my intention is to show that it is one of Hume's 
own arguments and therefore he cannot be a Realist, which clears ground for the true sceptical 
account of his metaphysics that is neutral on the divide between materialism and idealism. In 
order not to make the paper unnecessarily long, I will take the Enquiry and the Treatise as 
advancing the same argument although there are differences in details between them. As they are 
the only works where Hume presents this argument, I will limit my discussion to them and the 
Abstract of Treatise 1 and 2 (An Abstract of a Book lately Published: Entitled A Treatise of 
Human Nature etc. 1740).iii 
Hume's view on realism has been an ongoing controversy since his own time. In recent 
decades, its main manifestation has been the New Hume debate. As usual in philosophical 
controversies, there has not been a general agreement even on the subject of the debate, i.e. how 
'realism' should be understood. So Peter Kail, who defends a New Humean interpretation, has 
stressed the need to chart the different possible forms of the distinction between realism and anti-
realism and to compare Hume with them (2007a: xxvii). One of the forms of realism is 
conceptual in nature. According to this type of realism, there can be thinkable content for 
external objects and causation beyond mere regularity. In Hume's framework, this has a semantic 
consequence: talk about them is not totally meaningless because thinkable content provide 
meanings for words. This is a form of semantic realism. By contrast, one type of the conceptual 
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and semantic anti-realism is the position that does deny the thinkability and meaningfulness of 
external objects and causation as more than mere regularity (Kail 2007b: 253-5; 2008: 442-3). 
Below, I will argue that Kail's characterisation of the conceptual realism/anti-realism 
divide catches a core issue in the problem of Hume's view on realism: the thinkability of external 
objects. Nevertheless, I think that Hume scholars should start with Hume's own definition of 'real' 
and realism. Besides, Hume's definition is intended to be exact. So it may provide a precise 
starting point for the discussion even if not exhausting the discussion. In this respect, it seems to 
me that it serves the literature better than Kail's different possible types of realism and anti-
realism (Kail (2007a: 57) acknowledges this realism, though). I will also talk about one current 
use of the term ‘metaphysical realism’ which corresponds rather well to Hume's definition (Lowe 
2006: 177). For the sake of brevity, I will drop the attribute 'Metaphysical' and talk about 
'Realism' with a capital 'r' in order to distinguish it from Kail's realisms in particular, and the uses 
of 'realism' in contemporary philosophy in general. When I am speaking of 'Realism', it should be 
understood in the following sense. Realism is the position according to which there are 
existentially and causally perception-independent entities that exist continuously (no gaps) and 
externally to the perceiver in perception-independent space. 'Real' entities are beings that satisfy 
these criteria and 'Body' is a corporeal thing that is Real. The second profound argument concerns 
the existence of Bodies, i.e. perception-independent matter and bodies in various early modern 
materialist or substance-dualist ontologies. Since Hume thinks that those ontologies are the best 
accounts of Bodies (THN 1.4.4.2; 1.4.5.1; SBN 226; 232), the second profound argument is 
decisive regarding his attitude to the existence of material substance and Bodies, i.e. corporeal 
Real things. It is also so with regard to any Real entity because Real entities must be Bodies; they 
are, by definition, concrete (spatio-temporal) things. 
That this is the true Humean definition of Realism needs to be defended briefly. Hume 
begins his discussion of the existence of body or external objects by defining the subject of the 
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discussion in both the Treatise and the Enquiry (THN 1.4.2.2; SBN 187-8 and EHU 12.7-8; SBN 
151-2). When these definitions are coupled with the passages where Hume explicitly links his 
definitions to 'real' (THN 1.4.2.9-10; 20; 24; 1.4.4.5; SBN 190-1; 195-7; 199; 227 and EHU 12.9; 
SBN 152), it is clear that this is the Humean definition of Realism and Real. One of the definiens 
of Real entities, continuous existence, is explicit in Hume's definition in THN 1.4.2.2 (SBN 187-
8; see also EHU 12.8; SBN 152). In this definition of the Treatise, under 'existence distinct from 
the mind and perception', Hume comprehends both 'external position' and 'independence of 
existence and operation'. This shows two things. (1) External position is in perception-
independent space rather than perception-dependent space because Hume subsumes it under the 
existence distinct from the mind and perception. This is confirmed by the Enquiry: 'an external 
universe, which depends not on our perception’ (EHU 12.7; SBN 151). (2) The perception-
independence of Bodies is both existential and causal, which is a point that is too seldom noticed; 
Hume speaks about 'existence and operation'. Existential independence is rigid and it is put in 
terms of Hume's absolute or metaphysical modality (THN 1.3.14.35; SBN 172): it is 
metaphysically possible (does not entail a contradiction) that a Body exists and there is no 
perception (impression or idea) of it, or, indeed, any perception in the world. Causal 
independence is obviously stated in terms of Hume's causal modality. It means that perceiving a 
Body does not affect its properties and existence (perceiving does not create or destroy it). Hume 
must make this distinction between existential and causal independence, since he holds two views 
which are inconsistent without a distinction: a (simple) perception is both independent from and 
dependent on the mind, or to be more precise, other (simple) perceptions.iv On the one hand, a 
(simple) perception is independent from the mind in Hume's bundle theory of the mind because it 
is metaphysically possible that it exist without any mind, i.e. bundle of perceptions (THN 
1.4.2.39; SBN 207). On the other hand, Hume argues that a perception is dependent on the mind, 
or to be more precise, other (simple) perceptions (THN 1.4.2.44-5; SBN 210-11). In fact, it is the 
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difference between a perception and a Real entity that the former, while existentially independent 
as well as the latter, may be causally dependent on other perceptions while the latter does not 
depend causally on any perception (Ibid.). In order to make these statements consistent, the 
independence of a (simple) perception must be existential and its dependence has to be causal, 
which are two different forms of dependence/independence. The text, indeed, supports this. In 
THN 1.4.2.39 (SBN 207), Hume speaks about the existential independence. In THN 1.4.2.44-5 
(SBN 210-1), he argues that the causal circumstances of perception affect the content of sense-
impressions (and their ideas, in turn). These passages also put it beyond reasonable doubt that the 
existential independence is in terms of metaphysical modality. 
This paper has four sections. After the introduction, I will summarise my account of the 
second profound argument. At the same time, I will show why it forms a decisive argument 
against the Realist Hume interpretations. The last main section consists of my replies to the 
objections to the second profound argument being decisive. In the conclusion, I shall propose that 
the second profound argument, or rather, Hume's subscription to it, suggests a no-single-Hume 
interpretation of his attitude to Realism, which I have defended elsewhere (Hakkarainen 2012: 
301-6).v It also clears ground for the sceptical interpretation that Hume overcomes the putative 
dichotomy between materialism and idealism by his neutral view on it. 
1. THE OBJECTION: THE SECOND PROFOUND ARGUMENT 
The second profound argument begins with a principle that I think should be called 'the 
Proper Sensible Qualities Principle' (PSP) rather than the primary/secondary qualities distinction. 
Hume's statements of this principle vary slightly (EHU 12.15-6; SBN 154-5; THN 1.4.4.3-6; 15; 
SBN 226-8; 231). But there is a proposition that connects them: no proper sensible quality is 
Real.vi So this is the correct formulation of the PSP and Hume's denial of resemblance between 
the perceptions of proper sensibles and Bodies should be taken as a corollary of it. For the PSP 
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entails with suitable extra premises (about resemblance) that if there are Bodies, none of the 
perceptions of proper sensibles resembles anything in them. 
Talking about proper sensible qualities instead of secondary qualities calls for an 
argument as it is a common supposition that the second profound argument is premised on the 
primary/secondary qualities distinction. Elsewhere, I have made a full case for this, but it is 
possible to summarise the main reason here (Hakkarainen 2011: 237-40). This avoids saddling 
Hume with Locke’s gross misunderstanding in this respect. In his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, Locke repeatedly says that secondary qualities are powers in bodies (Locke 
[1689] 1975: 135). If Hume said that secondary qualities are nothing in Bodies, he would 
explicitly contradict Locke's words, which is implausible in this case. Fortunately, this 
misunderstanding may be avoided by realising that Hume's point is that none of the qualities that 
are perceived directly by one sense only, i.e. proper sensibles are Real. This is supported by the 
point that Hume calls these properties 'sensible qualities' and his list of them includes only what 
he takes as proper sensibles: colours, tactile qualities (hardness, temperature), sounds, smells and 
tastes (EHU 12.15-6; SBN 154-5; THN 1.4.4.3-14; SBN 226-31). It is also a fairly correct 
description of what 'new' materialist or substance dualist philosophers thought: none of them 
believed that there are proper sensible qualities in Bodies (Hakkarainen 2011: 239-40). 
In the Treatise, Hume advances a causal argument for the PSP: 'The conclusion drawn 
from them, is likewise as satisfactory as can possibly be imagin’d' (THN 1.4.4.4; SBN 227). It is 
also premised on Hume's fourth rule of causal reasoning (THN 1.3.15.6; SBN 173-4): 'from like 
effects we presume like causes' (THN 1.4.4.4; SBN 227).vii In the Treatise, Hume thus presents 
the PSP as a tenet that he endorses. It is also important to point out that holding the PSP does not 
mean commitment to the existence of Bodies and its corollary can be held hypothetically: if there 
are Bodies, then the perceptions of proper sensibles do not resemble anything in Bodies. I think 
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Hume must hold the corollary hypothetically because he endorses the PSP and as I will show, he 
cannot be a Realist. 
For the sake of argument, Hume distinguishes the PSP from what I call the Primary 
Qualities Principle (PMQ): 
 
For upon the removal of sounds, colours, heat, cold, and other sensible qualities, from the 
rank of continu’d independent existences, we are reduc’d merely to what are called 
primary qualities, as the only real ones, of which we have any adequate notion. These 
primary qualities are extension and solidity, with their different mixtures and 
modifications; figure, motion, gravity, and cohesion. (THN 1.4.4.5; SBN 227) 
 
Before proceeding to the next stage of the second profound argument, I have to make an 
important observation concerning Hume's view of the logical structure of what he calls the 
modern 'system' (THN 1.4.4.6; SBN 227). The relation between the PSP and PMQ is especially 
significant, for Kail, Don Garrett and Peter Millican have proposed that the second profound 
argument is a reductio ad absurdum of the entire system including the PSP (Kail 2007a: 70; 
Garrett 1997: 218; Millican 2002: 465). This is not correct, since Hume thinks that the PSP is 
logically independent from the PMQ. For the PSP is his main premise in the argument against the 
PMQ – as I will show just below. The independence of the PSP from the PMQ is also suggested 
by Hume's words just before stating the PMQ: 'This principle [PSP] being once admitted, all the 
other doctrines [e.g. PMQ] of that philosophy seem to follow by an easy consequence' (THN 
1.4.4.5; SBN 227; my emphasis). Thus, the second profound argument cannot be a reductio of the 
conjunction of the PMQ and the PSP. 
With these considerations in place, the next stage of the second profound argument can be 
put in relatively easy terms although Hume takes pains to argue for it in THN 1.4.4. For it 
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follows almost directly from his view on space in THN 1.2 – consequently, in the Enquiry, he is 
much briefer. According to Hume's view on space, extension or space is inconceivable without 
colours or tactile qualities such as temperature and hardness (THN 1.2.3.5 and 15; SBN 34 and 
38-9). From this, it directly follows that any perception of extension is a perception of colours or 
tactile qualities – or, more, a perception that is ultimately composed of the simple perceptions of 
coloured or tactile mathematical points (THN 1.4.4.8; SBN 228). Extension is the mere 'order' of 
these coloured or tactile mathematical points (THN 1.2.4.2; SBN 39-40). Colours and tactile 
qualities are proper sensibles. Thus, any perception of extension is fundamentally a perception of 
proper sensible qualities (THN 1.4.4.8; SBN 228). As such, by the corollary of the PSP and 
certain other premises of resemblance that I do not have to make explicit here, it cannot be a 
perception of Bodies. 
How about other primary qualities? Hume's (and Berkeley's) point is that as they 
presuppose extension (THN 1.4.4.7-11; SBN 228-30)viii, all of their perceptions are also 
perceptions of extension, which is ultimately an ordered collection of the simple perceptions of 
proper sensibles. Hence, by the corollary of the PSP, none of the perceptions of primary qualities 
can be the perception of a Body. The second stage of the second profound argument thus 
concludes that there cannot be any perception of Bodies: Bodies are imperceptible. This is not 
limited to the clear and distinct perceptions of Bodies; it concerns any perception of them. (THN 
1.4.4.9, 10; SBN 228-9; EHU 12.15; SBN 154-5) So the second profound argument involves 
conceptual anti-realism, in Kail's terms, regarding Bodies. 
Hume is clear that the conclusion of the second profound argument is the contradiction 
between consistent reasoning, causal reasoning, in particular, and believing in the existence of 
Bodies. But it is not obvious at all what the rational stance is with which Realism is contradictory 
and how this contradiction is supposed to follow from the imperceptibility of Bodies. There is 
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also the problem that Hume says so little about these issues. Let me first shoot down a tempting 
misunderstanding. 
In EHU 12.15.n.32 (SBN 155), Hume claims that he took the second profound argument 
from Berkeley. When we look at the candidate arguments in Berkeley (1998a: §10; 1998b: 1D, 
193-4), we see that Berkeley's argument concludes that the modern notion of Body involves a 
contradiction. Thus, Body according to this notion cannot exist. This might give us some ground 
to assume that the contradiction Hume is talking about is also involved in the notion of Body. 
Realism would contradict reason because the law of contradiction is a rational principle. This 
assumption suffers from the problem, however, that the text just does not support it. Neither in 
the Enquiry nor in the Treatise version of the second profound argument does Hume say that the 
notion of Body involves a contradiction (cf. THN 1.4.5.1; SBN 232; THN Appendix App. 10; 
SBN 633). Besides, it is hard to see how the law of contradiction could be a causally or 
inductively rational principle for Hume; it seems to be an intuitive or demonstrative principle. 
Fortunately, there is an important clue in both EHU and T: Hume says that the second 
profound argument annihilates Body (EHU 12.16; SBN 155 and THN 1.4.4.6; SBN 228). 
Furthermore, in THN 1.4.4.10 and 15 (SBN 229; 231), he speaks about exclusion. I take this to 
mean that on Hume's view, the argument destroys all the perceivable properties of Body. This fits 
well with what I have concluded so far: the second profound argument, by the corollary of the 
PSP, strips Body off Real properties. Since Hume thinks that there cannot any perception of 
objects without properties, 'bare particulars' in contemporary parlance (THN Appendix App. 19; 
SBN 635), the second profound argument annihilates Body as a thing of which there can be any 
perception. This is an important clue for the very reason that according to Hume believing 
presupposes thinkable content: no belief without some perception (e.g. THN Abstract Abs. 21; 
SBN 653-4; EHU 5.13; SBN 50). So when we add this Humean premise, it follows that rational 
persons ought not to believe in Realism. It is a rational norm that one should not believe in the 
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existence of Bodies of which one cannot have any perception. Hence, if rational persons are 
capable of following this rational norm, they do not, in fact, believe in the existence of Bodies: 
they refrain from this belief, suspend it. As it is contradictory to believe and not to believe in the 
same thing at the same time, the second profound argument concludes that it is contradictory to 
be rational and a Realist at the same time. So the contradiction lies between the rational 
suspension of believing in Realism and believing in it (at the same time). 
Yet I have not made it clear why Hume speaks about causal reasoning in the Treatise, that 
is, why it is precisely causal rationality that is inconsistent with believing in Realism. The answer 
is easy regarding the PSP, which Hume clearly takes as a causal tenet (or ‘inductively causal’, in 
modern parlance). He also apparently thinks that his view on space rests at least partially on 
empirical grounds because he supports it by empirical evidence (e.g. the ink spot experiment, 
THN 1.2.1.4; SBN 27-8). As direct sense-perception hardly supports a theory of perceiving 
space, this theory of Hume rests at least partially on a causally rational, that is, inferential, 
foundation. The same is true about his theory of belief (EHU 4, Part 2), which provides the 
premise that a belief presupposes a perception. It is thus understandable that Hume takes the 
suspension of belief in Realism following from the consistent and correct use of causal reasoning. 
The decisive objection to the Realist Hume interpretations lies exactly here. The problem 
with them is that they want to attribute both to Hume: consistent causal reasoning and the belief 
in the existence of Bodies. But then they attribute a contradiction to him of which he is very well 
aware. Their Hume is therefore a self-reflectively inconsistent philosopher. 
In the next section, I will argue that the Realist interpretations cannot escape this problem. 
The second profound argument, or Hume advancing it, thus forms a compelling argument against 
them. 
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2. REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS 
Let me first consider the textual evidence. First of all, Hume does not present any 
specific, explicit answer to the second profound argument after evincing it in the Enquiry or the 
Treatise. There may be speculation about a possible solution occurring before it in either work, 
but as far as I can see, there is not any solution explicitly in the text. I think this is a fact that 
should be taken seriously. For it suggests that Hume does not have any answer to the argument: 
he really does think that it is irrefutable and that consistent (causal) reasoning and being a Realist 
are inconsistent. 
Of course, lack of evidence is not evidence of absence. It may also be objected that Hume 
explicitly refutes Pyrrhonism in EHU 12.23 (SBN 159-60; see also THN 1.4.7.9ff.; SBN 269ff.). 
Does not this show that he eventually rejects the Pyrrhonian arguments, including the second 
profound argument, as well  (even if the refutation is in practical terms: wide-spread Pyrrhonism 
would be lethal to society)? I do not think so. My reason for thinking so is that Hume sharply 
distinguishes Pyrrhonism from the Pyrrhonian arguments, including the second profound 
argument. For him, Pyrrhonism is universal suspension of belief (whether this understanding of 
Pyrrhonism is historically correct or not): 'they [“the profounder and more philosophical 
sceptics”, i.e. Pyrrhonists] endeavour to introduce an universal doubt into all subjects of human 
knowledge and enquiry' (EHU 12.14; SBN 153; see also EHU 12.18; 22; SBN 156; 158). The 
Pyrrhonian arguments have their own conclusions, but the point is that their relation to 
Pyrrhonism is causal rather than logical or argumentative: they may or may not cause the 
universal suspension of belief (momentarily). This is shown by the following passages in which 
Hume uses causal terminology in describing this relation: 
 
Their [merely sceptical arguments] only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and 
irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism (EHU 12.15.n.32; SBN 155; 
WHY HUME CANNOT BE A REALIST 
-13- 
emphasis added). 
Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspence (EHU 12.18; 
SBN 156; emphasis added). 
a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by 
his profound reasonings (EHU 12.23; SBN 160; emphasis added). 
 
Finally, even if Hume does not use the term 'Pyrrhonism' in the Treatise (its first 
occurrence in his published works is in THN Abstract Abs. 27; SBN 657), in light of the Enquiry 
the following passage in the conclusion of Treatise 1 must be speaking about it and its relation to 
the Pyrrhonian arguments: 
 
But what have I here said, that reflections very refin’d and metaphysical have little or no 
influence upon us? This opinion I can scarce forbear retracting, and condemning from my 
present feeling and experience. The intense view of these manifold contradictions and 
imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am 
ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more 
probable or likely than another. (THN 1.4.7.8; SBN 268-9; the first and last emphases 
added) 
 
From the causal nature of the relation between the Pyrrhonian arguments and Pyrrhonism, 
it follows that Hume may consistently take these arguments as irrefutable, even subscribe to 
them, and reject Pyrrhonism. It does not involve any logical contradiction. This is, indeed, his 
view. Part of Hume's view on Pyrrhonism is that although Pyrrhonism itself, as suspending every 
belief, is untenable, the modern Pyrrhonian arguments are unanswerable: 
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all his [the Pyrrhonist's] objections [...] can have no other tendency than to show the 
whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are 
not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation 
of these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised against them. (EHU 
12.23; SBN 160; emphasis added) 
 
Hume also says that the Pyrrhonist's scruples may be overcome only by instinct, which 
means that they are irrefutable as arguments: 
 
To bring us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more serviceable, than to be 
once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt, and of the impossibility, 
that any thing, but the strong power of natural instinct, could free us from it. (EHU 12.25; 
SBN 162) 
 
Moreover, in the note discussing Berkeley that Hume inserted into the second profound 
argument argument in EHU, he maintains that it, as a Berkeleyan argument, 'admit[s] of no 
answer' (12.15.n.32; SBN 155; see also 12.14; 21; SBN 153-4; 158-9). All in all, Hume must take 
the second profound argument as irrefutable: consistent (causal) reasoning and being a Realist 
are, indeed, inconsistent. 
Yet Hume scholars holding a Realist interpretation have proposed various ways to avoid 
attributing the conclusion of the second profound argument. Next I will take the most serious 
challenges, seven altogether, one by one and show that they are ineffective. 
(1) Garrett has challenged Hume's endorsement of the PSP and thus Hume's subscription 
to the entire argument. According to Garrett, Hume 'pointedly refrains from endorsing' the PSP 
(1997: 220). I have shown elsewhere, by a meticulous analysis of the relevant texts, that even if it 
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is true that Hume never asserts it in the first person, there is sufficient textual evidence for his 
endorsement of this principle (Hakkarainen 2011, 240-7). As I pointed out before, the clearest 
evidence may be found in the Treatise where Hume maintains that the PSP, as the conclusion of a 
causal argument, is 'as satisfactory as can possibly be imagin’d' (THN 1.4.4.4; SBN 227). 
(2) Kail (2007a: 70) suggests that the conclusion of the second profound argument does 
not satisfy Hume's criterion of justification or warrant, what Garrett calls Hume's 'Title Principle': 
'Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to.' (THN 
1.4.7.11; SBN 270) Kail is not very clear about this possibility, but the idea is something like the 
following. Hume takes the premises of the second profound argument as justified or warranted. 
He also thinks that the conclusion of the argument does follow from the premises. The argument 
is valid (in some logic). But Hume does not take the conclusion as justified or warranted, since it 
is not warranted by the Title Principle: it does not mix 'itself with some propensity'. 
It is not easy to reply to this objection as it should be spelled out in detail: for instance, 
what mixing 'itself with some propensity' exactly means. Still it suffers from a serious textual 
problem. The Title Principle is missing from the Enquiry, Section 12. It occurs only in the 
Treatise. The passages speaking about the involuntariness of the Realist belief, which I will 
discuss below, make a different point. So if Hume answered to THN 1.4.4 by this principle – and 
even this is dubious as the immediate context of the principle is a different sceptical argument –, 
he does not do so on the second thought. Hence, the Title Principle cannot be Hume's considered 
answer to the second profound argument. 
(3) However, Kail would protest to this that Hume not only says that Berkeley's 
arguments 'admit of no answer', he also writes that they 'produce no conviction'. According to 
Kail (2007a: 70), this phrase shows that Hume eventually thinks that the second profound 
argument, or rather its conclusion, does not compel assent because it does not satisfy the Title 
Principle. I am afraid this is a misunderstanding of the phrase. It does not criticise the second 
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profound argument. Why would Hume first praise the argument and then immediately criticise it 
in the same sentence? The reading that renders the sentence coherent is that 'produce no 
conviction' refers to the rational attitude of suspending the Realist belief as the conclusion of the 
irrefutable second profound argument. 
(4) John P. Wright's Realist solution is to distinguish proper believing and conceiving 
from believing as supposing in Hume's theory (1995: 226 and 2007: 89-90). He does this in terms 
of the distinction between ideas that are clear and distinct and those that are not, such as obscure 
and confused ideas. Clear and distinct ideas that satisfy the conjunction of Hume's Copy Principle 
(THN 1.1.1.7; SBN 4) and the simple/complex ideas distinction (THN 1.1.1.2; SBN 2) provide 
the content for proper beliefs conceptions, whereas the content of beliefs as mere suppositions are 
non-clear and non-distinct ideas. In the case of the second profound argument, this is supposed to 
answer it in the following manner (1995: 231-4). Wright admits that the existence of Bodies 
cannot be held as a proper belief because Bodies cannot be conceived by clear and distinct ideas. 
In terms of the proper beliefs and clear and distinct ideas, the second profound argument works. 
Still, the existence of Bodies may be believed as an assumption in virtue of an 'inconceivable 
supposition' of things having only primary qualities, which is Kail's conceptual realism. In the 
domain of beliefs as mere suppositions, the rational norm of refraining does not hold and 
believing the existence of Bodies as a supposition does not contradict it. In addition, on Wright's 
view, Hume's subscription to the PSP gives a reason to hold a Realist interpretation, since the 
PSP presupposes the existence of Bodies, and since Hume thinks that it has a firm inductive-
causal basis (1995: 231-2). 
My reply to Wright is both textual and philosophical. Although Hume might make a 
distinction between believing as supposing and proper believing, he does not explicitly employ 
any inconceivable supposition to avoid the conclusion of the second profound argument. The 
possible commitments to inconceivable suppositions occur in different contexts (THN 1.2.6.8-9; 
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1.4.5.19-20; SBN 67-8; 241), and even this commitment is dubious because of THN 1.4.2.2 
(SBN 188) where Hume says that 'we have already shown its absurdity'. So there is not any 
specific textual evidence for Wright's interpretation here. My main reason for not holding 
Wright's interpretation is philosophical though: Wright's inconceivable supposition, i.e. obscure 
and confused ideas, cannot answer the second profound argument. One of the points of the 
second profound argument is conceptual anti-realism: there cannot be any perception of Bodies – 
whether clear and distinct or obscure and confused. This follows (mainly) from the PSP and 
Hume's view on space. As according to Hume, 'nothing is ever present to the mind but 
perceptions', there cannot be any thinkable content present to the mind of Bodies. Bodies without 
primary qualities just are patently unthinkable: they are completely out of the reach of human 
understanding. So there cannot be any thinkable content even for taking their existence for 
granted, believing in them in that manner. Thus, not even the obscure and confused idea of the 
existence of Bodies is able to provide the means to avoid the contradiction between Humean 
reason and Realism. Furthermore, Wright's contention that the PSP presupposes the existence of 
Bodies just is not true. It merely states negatively that proper sensibles are not Real; it does not 
involve any positive assumption of existence. From this, with suitable extra premises, it follows 
that if there are Bodies, the perceptions of proper sensibles do not resemble anything in them. 
This does not involve commitment to the existence of Bodies. 
(5) In addition to Wright, Galen Strawson defends a conceptually realist answer to the 
second profound argument. He claims that 'relative ideas' offer an escape route for a Realist 
interpretation (2002: 239-40). Garrett has sometimes proposed the same conceptually realist 
solution (2007). The idea is that even if there cannot be a 'positive', i.e. descriptive, contentful 
idea (or impression) of Bodies, it is possible to single them out as the causes of some sense-
impressions. This happens by means of the relative ideas of Bodies that consist of three elements: 
a positive idea of a sense-impression, a causal relation and the imperceptible Bodily cause of the 
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impression, an incomprehensible 'x'. An example of the relative idea would be the thought that 
there is an unperceived Body that causes a particular impression of red. In virtue of these relative 
ideas, it is possible to suppose the existence of Bodies and the conclusion of the second profound 
argument is avoided. 
There are both textual and philosophical problems in this solution. Textually, its ground is  
thin. The only place where Hume might explicitly employ something like a relative idea to 
answer to the second profound argument is the last sentence of EHU 12.16 (SBN 155), which 
was inserted into it in the posthumous 1777 edition (the possible uses of relative ideas in THN 
1.2.6.9 (SBN 68) and 1.4.5.19-20 (SBN 241) are not employed as a solution to THN 1.4.4). Let 
me discuss the philosophical problem first and then come back to this passage. 
I think there is a decisive philosophical argument against Strawson: Hume cannot commit 
himself to the relative idea of Body if he is consistent with his nominalism and view on relations. 
There is a passage in the Treatise that strongly suggests that the ideas of relations are complex – 
whether 'natural' or 'philosophical relations': 'These complex ideas may be divided into Relations, 
Modes, and Substances' (THN 1.1.4.7; SBN 13; cf. 1.1.5.1; SBN 13-4).  It seems to me that this 
is also how it must be in Hume's theory of ideas. According to him, simple ideas are mereological 
atoms: they do not divide into proper parts (THN 1.1.1.2; SBN 2; EHU 7.4; SBN 62). How then 
could the ideas of relations be simple? For relational facts themselves [R(a, b) holds] are always 
composite, consisting of the relation and one term at least (if there are reflexive relations) – no 
relation without relata. The relevant point implied here for present purposes is that the putative 
relative idea of a Body collapses into its positive idea component. To Hume, the necessary 
condition for thinking about a relation is that there must be a perception of both its terms; no 
relation is present to the mind without both of its terms being present – indeed, no complex 
perception is present to the mind without its proper parts being present. However, in the case of 
the putative relative idea of Bodies, there cannot be any perception of the other term in the 
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supposed causal relation (as Strawson himself acknowledges); the Body itself is, in principle, an 
imperceptible x. Hence there cannot be any idea – or indeed, thought – of the relation. Therefore 
it is not possible to distinguish this alleged relative idea from one of its three components, the 
positive idea of the sense-impression; for there cannot be any positive idea of the third 
component, i.e. the Body. Thus, the putative relative idea collapses into its positive idea 
component, which, given the second profound argument, is not an idea of a Body. The 
conceptual anti-realism of the second profound argument regarding Bodies still stands. 
Even if it were admitted that the idea of this type of supposed causation is provided by the 
abstract idea of causation, this would not help.ix The abstract idea of causation cannot be of this 
specific type of (possible) causation as the above argument shows. It must be of some other 
specific type because in Hume's nominalism (THN 1.1.7) every idea of causation is the idea of 
some particular determinate causal relation, i.e. token of causation. It is, for example, the idea of 
some observed causal relation where both the cause and the effect were perceived. So if this 
'substitute' causal relation is used in order to single out the Bodily cause of some sense-
impression, it may single out something that is not actually the cause – we cannot know. It may, 
so to speak, point to the wrong object or even type of entity. This follows from the fact that the 
substitute causal relation is indeterminate in this case. The point can be illustrated by an everyday 
example. Let us suppose that I know that smoking causes cancer. It is pretty obvious that 
knowing this particular causal relation does not help me in singling out the cause of Alzheimer’s. 
Regarding the relative idea, it follows that the resulting relative idea of Body must be 
indeterminate as well: it cannot  single out any particular entity or even a type of entities – it may 
pick out, say, an impression instead of Body as the cause of some sense-impression.x At best, the 
putative relative idea of Body is not therefore the idea of Body, which is a conceptually anti-
realist result. It does not provide a means to think about Body specifically. 
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Hume's last-minute insertion into EHU 12.16 (SBN 155) should be read from this 
perspective: 
 
Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a 
manner annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something, as the 
cause of our perceptions; a notion so imperfect, that no sceptic will think it worth while to 
contend against it. 
 
On pain of making Hume inconsistent with his nominalism and view on relations, this 
passage ought to be read as Hume foreseeing Strawson's conceptually realist reply to the second 
profound argument and pointing out that it does not work: 'a notion so imperfect, that no sceptic 
will think it worth while to contend against it.' The passage should not be read, then, as signalling 
a commitment to the relative idea of Body. As this is the only place where Hume might solve the 
second profound argument by the relative idea, Strawson's view is not finally supported by any 
specific textual evidence. 
(6) The basic naturalist point is that human beings, even sceptics, are incapable of 
following the rational norm that Realism ought not to be believed; we just cannot help but believe 
in the existence of Bodies. It is not psychologically possible to refrain from this belief. As such, 
the second profound argument is impotent against it. This kind of interpretation may be 
supported by what I call 'the involuntariness passages' where Hume seems to claim the 
involuntariness of the belief in the existence of Bodies. 
In EHU 12.23 (SBN 160), Hume states that the only tendency that the Pyrrhonian 
arguments can have is to show 'the whimsical condition of mankind'. We must act, reason, and 
believe although we cannot found these operations on any certain basis (or refute the arguments 
against them). The natural reading of this passage is that it also alludes to the belief in the 
WHY HUME CANNOT BE A REALIST 
-21- 
existence of Bodies. This is therefore an involuntary belief against which there are irrefutable 
arguments. 
In a familiar passage in the Abstract, Hume concludes that nature always overcomes 
Pyrrhonism and compels us to assent to external existence (THN Abstract Abs. 27; SBN 657). 
Equally famously, he begins his explanation of the belief in Direct Realism in the Treatise by 
asserting that '’tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must 
take for granted in all our reasonings.’. (THN 1.4.2.1; SBN 187). The sceptic 
 
must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, tho’ he cannot pretend by 
any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his 
choice, and has doubtless, esteem’d it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our 
uncertain reasonings and speculations (Ibid.). 
 
Despite the fact that Hume expresses doubts about this statement in the penultimate 
paragraph of the section, he finishes it with the following affirmation: 
 
For this reason I rely entirely upon them [the senses]; and take it for granted, whatever 
may be the reader’s opinion at this present moment, that an hour hence he will be 
perswaded there is both an external and internal world. (THN 1.4.2.57; SBN 218) 
 
Between these, Hume also writes that even philosophers have 'so great a propensity to 
believe' in Realism that faced with the non-Reality of perceptions, they invent Representative 
Realism (THN 1.4.2.56; SBN 218; see also 50; SBN 213-4). 
Finally, just before proclaiming the whimsical condition of mankind, Hume writes that 
'[n]ature is always too strong for principle' (EHU 12.23; SBN 160). This formulation is 
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reminiscent of the well-known passage in the Abstract. The same point is also made when Hume 
discusses the second 'species' of Academical philosophy in EHU 12.25 (SBN 162), which I 
already quoted: 
 
To bring us to so salutary a determination [Academical philosophy], nothing can be more 
serviceable, than to be once thoroughly convinced of … the impossibility, that any thing, 
but the strong power of natural instinct, could free us from it [Pyrrhonism]. 
 
It seems to me that in the light of all these passages it is not reasonable to deny that the 
natural causes of the belief in Body are psychologically so strong that the belief cannot be 
permanently suspended or rejected.xi 
My reply to this basic naturalist point is very simple. Hume is explicit that it is, indeed, 
psychologically possible to refrain from believing in the existence of Bodies. The only thing is 
that this refraining must be merely momentary. Hence, he must allow the psychological 
possibility for human beings to follow, even if not permanently, the rational norm that Realism 
should not be believed. The clearest textual evidence for this is formed by the following 
passages, which I quote above: 
 
Their [Berkeleyan sceptical arguments including the second profound argument] only 
effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the 
result of scepticism (EHU 12.15.n.32; SBN 155). 
a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by 
his profound reasonings (EHU 12.23; SBN 160). 
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(7) Finally, an objection that is close to the naturalist reply and need to be addressed 
would be that in the conclusion of the second profound argument, the contradiction is inevitable 
or not a problem in philosophy in the end. The section of the Treatise advancing the argument, 
1.4.4, is part of Hume's 'natural history of philosophy' and its purpose is merely to show that even 
the best account of Body so far leads to a contradiction. Contradictions and conflicts are inherent 
in philosophy and the metaphysics of Body. 
However, there are two fundamental problems with this suggestion. First, recall that 
Hume endorses the PSP, which is a component of the modern system. So it is simply not so that 
the modern account of Body, which is the best theory, is totally untenable; Hume thinks that there 
is something correct in the modern system. Secondly, Hume is clear in his recapitulation of the 
conclusion of THN 1.4.4 in THN 1.4.7 that this particular contradiction ought not to be accepted 
in philosophy. Let me remind you of the recap: 
 
Or in case we prefer neither of them, but successively assent to both, as is usual among 
philosophers, with what confidence can we afterwards usurp that glorious title, when we 
thus knowingly embrace a manifest contradiction? (THN 1.4.7.4; SBN 266) 
 
So even if Hume thought that this contradiction is inevitable on certain assumptions, it 
would still be a deep problem with which philosophers should come to terms. In general, Hume is 
very reluctant to accept contradictions in philosophy. Take, for instance, his criticism of his 
account of personal identity involving a contradiction in the Appendix – although we do not 
know what that contradiction precisely is (THN Appendix App. 21; SBN 636).xii 
I have gone through every serious objection to Hume's endorsement of the second 
profound argument. I have shown that they do not work. It seems to me that this gives a sufficient 
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reason to conclude that Hume commits himself to the second profound argument and its 
conclusion. Hence, he cannot be a Realist. 
3. CONCLUSION 
I would like to conclude the paper by pointing out what my argument suggests. First, that 
we should endorse what I have called a 'no-single-Hume interpretation' (Hakkarainen 2012: 
297ff.). On the one hand, the second profound argument establishes that Hume cannot be a 
Realist. On the other hand, the involuntariness passages show it is not psychologically possible 
for him, by his own lights, perpetually to refrain from believing in the existence of Bodies. In 
order to avoid the contradiction between these, we have to make a distinction. Richard Popkin's 
solution is to draw a temporal distinction between Hume's moods or moments as a sceptic and a 
Realist (Popkin 1980: 112; 114-6; 119-20; 123-6; 130-2). Robert Fogelin would say that the 
difference is in perspectives: in one perspective, Hume is not a Realist, in another, he is (1998: 
164-8). Donald L.M. Baxter makes a distinction between different types of assent (2006: 114-7). 
Hume withdraws the active rational assent to the existence of Bodies, but eagerly assents to them 
naturally. My interpretation, which I have defended elsewhere (Hakkarainen 2012: 301-6), is that 
Hume suspends his judgement on Realism in the domain of philosophy, whereas, when the 
philosophical analysis of his belief in the domain of everyday life is given (as Hume does in THN 
1.4.2), he can be said to be a firm Realist. Philosophy and everyday life are two domains of 
doxastic assent that differ in degree. They are distinct because epistemic standards in them are 
different: in philosophy, they are theoretical virtues such as consistency and coherence rather 
than the more practical values of everyday life. 
Furthermore, it seems to me that accepting the second profound argument as Hume's 
argument clears ground for the true sceptical interpretation of Hume's metaphysics that is neutral 
on the divide between materialism and idealism. On this reading, there are perceptions and 
entities composed of them such as minds and bodies, but whether there are other things in the 
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world, e.g. Bodies, Hume suspends his judgement in the domain of metaphysics and 
philosophy.xiii 
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NOTES 
                                                          
i. Henceforth 'Enquiry' or 'EHU'. 
ii. Henceforth 'Treatise' or 'T'. 
iii. Henceforth 'Abstract' or 'Abs.' 
iv. Speaking about perception-independence rather than mind-independence is more precise for the simple reason 
that according to Hume's bundle theory, a mind depends on the perceptions composing it. 
v.  all the sensible qualities of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c. are merely secondary, and 
exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind, without any external archetype or 
model, which they represent. (EHU 12.15; SBN 154). 
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all the qualities, perceived by the senses, be in the mind, not in the object (Ibid.). 
  
all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the object. (EHU 12.16; SBN 155) 
  
colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold [...] be nothing but impressions in the mind, deriv’d from the 
operation of external objects, and without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects. (THN 1.4.4.3; 
SBN 226) 
  
the impressions of colour, sound, &c. are confest to be nothing but internal existences, and to arise from 
causes, which no ways resemble them. (Ibid.4; SBN 227) 
  
the removal of sounds, colours, heat, cold, and other sensible qualities, from the rank of continu’d 
independent existences (Ibid.5; SBN 227) 
  
colours, sounds, tastes, and smells be merely perceptions (Ibid.6; SBN 228). 
  
Colour is excluded from any real existence. (Ibid.8; SBN 228) 
  
the exclusion of colours, sounds, heat and cold from the rank of external existences (Ibid.10; SBN 229). 
  
neither colour, sound, taste, nor smell have a continu’d and independent existence. (Ibid.15; SBN 231) 
vi. This is also true about the other statements of the principle in Hume's works (Hakkarainen 2011:  240-6) 
vii. I agree with Louis Loeb, however, that there is a gap in the argument that Hume did not spot (Hakkarainen 2011, 
253). 
viii. Hume argues that this is also true of solidity as it is impenetrability, which presupposes at least two points or 
bodies, i.e. extension (THN 1.4.4.9, 10 and 14; SBN 228-9; 231). 
ix. Garrett made me this comment in conversation. 
x. These points elaborate on (Flage 2007: 146-53) and (Winkler 2007: 59-64). 
xi. The psychological character of this conclusion should be stressed, though: it is not an epistemic conclusion of 
justification or warrant. Hence, Hume is not bringing forward the Title Principle in them. 
xii. See also EHU 2.4; 4.21; 5.10; 8.8; 8.36; 12.20; 12.20.n.34; THN 1.1.5.8; 1.4.4.1; 1.4.5.1-2; 14; 1.4.6.2; 1.4.7.4-8, 
and Appendix App.10; SBN 18; 37; 47-8; 84; 103; 156.7; 156; 15; 225; 232; 239; 251-2; 265-8, and 633. 
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